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their orchards, Home Place, prior to 1993; they did not drill a well for
the other orchard, D'Hanis, until 1995. Based upon the fact that the
Braggs did not qualify as existing users for the D'Hanis orchard, their
permit application was denied. The Braggs brought suit because they
could not grow pecans in commercial quantities with the single permit
granted for Home Place.
The Property Rights Act ("PRA") provided for a cause of action for
real property owners if there was governmental action taken without
preparing a takings impact assessment ("TIA"). The Braggs argued
that pursuant to the PRA, the Authority was required to prepare a TIA
before promulgating rules governing aquifer permits, and before
applying those rules to the Braggs' pending application.
Since the PRA applied to "governmental entities," including
political subdivisions, and the Authority was considered a political
subdivision, the Braggs maintained that the Authority's promulgation
of rules constituted a government action that was subject to the PRA.
The trial court found the Authority's well-permitting rules and the
proposed actions on the Braggs' permit application were void because
the Authority did not prepare a TIA. The court of appeals vacated in
part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed.
The Supreme Court concluded that based upon the FAA, the
Authority was not required to prepare a TIA. The Court recognized
that the PRA applies to governmental entities when they make rules,
but exempts these entities from the requirement of a TIA when the
entity acts pursuant to its enabling statute in preventing waste or
protecting the owner's rights of interest in groundwater. Since the
Authority adopted well-permitting rules pursuant to the EAA, an
enabling act that gave the Authority all of the powers, rights and
privileges necessary to manage, conserve, preserve and protect the
aquifer and to prevent the waste or pollution of water in the aquifer
the PRA did not apply.
Melissa L. Gordon
VERMONT
Cmty. Nat'l Bank v. State, 782 A.2d 1195 (Vt. 2001) (holding an
interest in condominium property constructed on lake landfill is
subject to Vermont's public trust doctrine).
Community National Bank and Newport Harbor Club
Condominium Association (collectively "National Bank") appealed a
superior courtjudgment in favor of the State of Vermont ("Vermont").
The superior court concluded National Bank held the condominium
property subject to the Vermont's public trust interest, and the
property's diminution in value was insufficient to estop Vermont's
interest.
In 1986, National Bank constructed condominiums on filled lands
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that were once a part of Lake Memphremagog. It discovered, through
a prospective purchaser's tide search in 1969, the Vermont Water
Resources Board ("Board") had required a former owner to dredge a
portion of the lake bottom, and use it as fill for a Newport city
boathouse. The Board stated the order did not convey any tide or
interest to the landfill or to lands lying under public waters or waters
affected.
The current land owners, the Stevens, brought their
concerns to Reginald LaRosa, the Department of Water Resources,
and Environmental Engineering's operations chief. As a result,
LaRosa concluded the order had not required work done below the
low water mark and the state had no property interest.
In 1998, National Bank discovered the property was located on
filled land and reduced the units' appraised value. As such, it
commenced action against Vermont, seeking a declaration that the
public trust doctrine did not apply, or, alternatively, estopping
Vermont from asserting any interest in the property.
National Bank first argued the legislature had the power to
transfer public trust lands into private ownership free from state claim.
The court entertained the transfer idea but rather, required the state's
intent to abandon. The court ruled intent must be clearly expressed
or necessarily implied and statutes were interpreted in favor of
retaining public interest in tidelands. In the case at bar, the court
found no express or implied intent. The plaintiffs argued LaRosa's
declaration constituted Vermont's intent to hold no interest in the
condominium property. While LaRosa was in charge of managing the
State's public trust lands, the court ruled the legislature had not
delegated authority to LaRosa to abandon or convey into private
ownership all public trust lands.
Thus, National Bank alternatively argued Vermont was equitably
estopped from asserting the public-trust doctrine because the
diminished property values resulted in injustice, which required an
equitable remedy. However, the court found the injustice was not of
sufficient magnitude to justify estoppel. Thus, the court held the
equitable estoppel doctrine applicable to lands held in public trust.
Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed the superior court's decision.
Jon Hyman
WASHINGTON
Rothweiler v. Clark Cty., 29 P.3d 758 (Wash. App. 2001) (holding
Clark County did not have a duty to improve a drainage system, but
did have a duty to maintain the system's original efficiency; the County
was not liable for damages resulting from the system being
overwhelmed).
In June

1997, heavy rains overwhelmed a drainage system

